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I. Introduction
Imagine that you have come down with a cold. You immediately head
to the nearest drug store in search of medicine to relieve your symptoms.
You walk up and down the aisle and you notice that there are multiple
variations of the drug that you need — Tylenol next to acetaminophen,
Robitussin next to guaifenesin, etc. You compare the two equivalent drugs
and you note that most, if not all, of the ingredients are the same. The only
difference, aside from the name and packaging, seems to be the price at
which these drugs are sold. Did you ever consider what the effects would
be if competitive non-brand-name drugs did not enter the market at all?
A “generic drug” is defined as a term referring to any drug product
that is marketed under its chemical name that is comparable to a brandname drug product in dosage form, strength, quality and performance
characteristics, and intended use.1 Generic drugs are sold at a price
substantially discounted from their respective brand-name drug, even
though they are chemically identical.2 Creating a new drug is expensive
because extensive research and development are required along with
clinical trials. Because generic drug makers do not need to develop a drug
from scratch, the costs to bring drugs to the market are significantly less
than drugs recently created through research and development.3
Consequently, generic drugs are significantly cheaper than brand-name
drugs. Thus, generic drugs save consumers an estimated eight to ten billion
dollars a year at retail pharmacies, and even billions more when used by
hospitals.4
Like most new products and inventions, new drugs are developed
under patent protection. Generally speaking, a patent application filed on
or after June 8, 1995 has a term that begins on the date the patent issues and
ends twenty years from its filing date.5 The patent serves to protect the
investment made in the development of the new drugs by granting the
company, who conducted the research, the exclusive right to sell the drug

1. Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm
(last visited Jan. 7, 2015).
2. Generic Drugs, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. A CBO Study: How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices
and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, at 14, (July 1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/pharm.pdf.
5. U.S. Patent Act 35 U.S.C. §154(2).
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while the patent is in effect.6 Generic drugs, however, have been allowed
an exception through the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 — more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act. Drug companies can submit an abbreviated new drug application
(“ANDA”) for approval to market a generic product.7 An ANDA must
contain data, which when submitted to the Food and Drug Administration’s
(“FDA”) Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Office of Generic
Drugs, provides for the review and approval of a generic drug product.8
Once approved, an applicant may manufacture and market the generic drug
product to provide a safe, effective, and low-cost alternative to the
American public.9 This ANDA process does not require the generic drug
company to repeat costly clinical research related to ingredients or dosage
forms that have already been approved for safety and effectiveness for the
brand-name drugs.10 The first company to file an ANDA for a particular
drug gets exclusive rights to market the drug as the generic alternative to
the brand named drug for 180-days.11 After this six months period, other
companies may sell generics and enter the marketspace.
In response to the Hatch-Waxman Act, brand-name companies and
generic drug companies now settle lawsuits in order to maximize their own
profits. Any two competitors can profit by agreeing not to compete with
each other, as long as they can find a way to split the profits.12 The longer
the competition is delayed, the more profits will be accumulated. In 2013,
the Supreme Court dealt with this issue in the case FTC v. Actavis, and
deemed that these types of patent settlements could potentially face
antitrust scrutiny.13 The Supreme Court considered the legality of patent
litigation settlements that affect competition between branded and generic
competitors. These policies and precedents, alongside antitrust competition
policy, underscore the importance of drug market competition in U.S.

6.
7.
8.

Generic Drugs, supra note 1.
Id.
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDeve
lopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics (last
visited July 14, 2015).
9. ANDA, supra note 8.
10. Generic Drugs, supra note 1.
11. 21 U.S.C. § 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
12. Aaron Edlin, Scott Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Actavis and Error
Costs: A Reply to Critics, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, at 1 (Oct. 2014).
13. See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013).
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healthcare policy.14 Accordingly, in my Note, I will discuss the effect of
generic brands in the market, how the Hatch-Waxman Act affects anticompetition within the pharmaceutical sphere, how the Supreme Court
approaches this issue, and how lower courts have responded to the
Supreme Court’s ruling regarding these settlements.

II. The Effects of Generic Drugs in the Marketplace
The Hatch-Waxman Act, which brought about the abbreviated
pathway for generic drug approval, spurred the growth of the current
generic drug industry in the United States.15 To gain FDA approval, a
generic drug must contain the same active ingredients as the innovator
drug; be identical in strength, dosage form, and route of administration;
have the same use indications; be bioequivalent, meet the same batch
requirements for identity, strength, purity, and quality; and be
manufactured under the same strict standards of FDA’s good
manufacturing practice regulations required for innovator products.16 The
Generic Pharmaceutical Association noted that the generic drug industry
has saved the American public $1.2 trillion over the past thirty years since
the launch of the Hatch-Waxman Act.17 The increased trend in new drug
approvals is a positive sign of the level of innovation demonstrated by the
industry.18
The use of generics has increased substantially since the mid-1990s, in
part because of increases in the mechanisms available to promote generic
use, including incentives in commercial insurance plans and public
coverage, such as tiered formularies with lower patient co-payments for

14. Luke M. Olson & Brett W. Wendling, The Effect of Generic Drug Competition on Generic Drug
Prices During the Hatch-Waxman 180-Day Exclusivity Period, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 1 (Apr. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/reports/estimating-effect-entrygeneric-drug-prices-using-hatch-waxman-exclusivity/ wp317.pdf.
15. Mike Chace-Ortiz, Trends and Development in the U.S. Generics Drug Industry 2014, LIFE
SCIENCES CONNECT (June 26, 2014), http://lsconnect.thomsonreuters.com/trends-developments-u-s-genericsdrug-industry-2014/.
16. Generic Drugs, supra note 1.
17. Generic Drug Savings in the U.S., GENERIC PHARM. ASSOC. 2 (2013), available at
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/2013_Savings_Study_12.19.2013_FINAL.pdf.
18. Jody Fisher, U.S. Drug Market Trends: Looking Beyond the LOE to the New Normal,
PM360ONLINE (June 1, 2013), http://www.pm360online.com/u-s-drug-market-trends-looking-beyond-theloe-to-the-new-normal/.
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generic than for brand-name drugs, and restricting formulary coverage to
generics in certain therapeutic categories.19
Since 1993, sales of drugs have increased from about $50 billion per
year to around $300 billion in 2012.20 Many policymakers view generic
drug competition as the principal method to contain the rapid growth in
drug costs, which currently represents the fastest growing segment of
healthcare expenditures in the United States.21
Total healthcare system spending on medicine reached $320 billion in
2011.22 Over 80% of a brand’s prescription volume is replaced by generics
within six months of a patent expiring.23 As a result, generic products have
increased its share of total dispersed prescriptions in the US from 36% in
1994 to 84% in 2012.24 Generics also bring savings directly to patients. In
2010, the average copayment for a generic drug was $6.06 per prescription,
compared to $34.77 for brand named drugs.25 During that year, generic use
generated more than $157 billion in savings.26 Savings from generic
medications have continued to grow at an exponential rate, reaching more
than $360 billion from 2001 by the end of 2010.27
The number of generic companies manufacturing a specific drug
further affects the market. New brand-name drugs generate nearly all of
their sales during a market exclusivity period (“MEP”), which is the time
period between market launch of a brand-name drug and the launch of its
first generic.28 On average, the first generic competitor prices its product
only slightly lower than the price of the brand-name manufacturer.29 The
19. Henry Grabowski, Genia Long & Richard Mortimer, Brief Report: Recent Trends in
Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, J. MED. ECON. 2, available at http://fds.duke.edu/
db/attachment/2575.
20. Fisher, supra note 18, at 1.
21. Olson & Wendling, supra note 14, at 1.
22. The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2011, IMS INST. FOR
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS 2 (2012), available at https://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/
Insights/IMS%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%20Informatics/IHII_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.pdf.
23. The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2010, IMS INST. FOR
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS 3 (2011), available at http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/
imshealth/Global/Content/IMS%20Institute/Static%20File/IHII_UseOfMed_report.pdf.
24. Grabowski et al., supra note 19, at 2.
25. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 23, at 14.
26. SAVINGS: An Economic Analysis of Generic Drug Usage in the U.S., GENERIC PHARM. ASSOC. 3
(2011), available at https://www.tevagenerics.com/assets/base/pdf/Savings,An EconomicAnalysis.pdf.
27. Savings, supra note 26.
28. Grabowski et al., supra note 19.
29. Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm
129385.htm (last updated Mar. 1, 2010).
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entrance of a second generic manufacturer reduces the average generic
price to nearly half the brand name price.30 Any additional generic
companies manufacturing the brand-name drug affect the market less
drastically.31 For products that attract a large number of generic
manufacturers, the average generic price falls to 20% of the branded
price.32

III. Patent Settlements
A. Reverse Payment Settlements

A trend that has been rising in response to the increasing number of
generics entering the pharmaceutical market are patent settlements that
allow brand-name drugs to hold onto their control of the market. These
types of arrangement raise concerns associated with anticompetitive
behavior by brand-name companies preventing other players in the market
from entering.33 Over the past ten years, patent settlements have enabled
dozens of first-time generics to come to market many months before
patents on the counterpart brand-name drugs expired.34 In 2011, of the
twenty-two new generic drug launches, settlements allowed sixteen of
these generics to launch prior to patent expiry.35
One particular type of settlement is a reverse payment settlement
agreement, also known as “pay-for-delay” deals, which involve a brandname drug manufacturer compensating a generic brand entrant to abandon
its patent challenge and not to enter the market for a number of years.36
This settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather
than the other way around, which is what is usually expected.37 The
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) estimated that these deals cost
American consumers $3.5 billion a year.38 These generic firms are now
agreeing to delay their launches not just for cash, but for a promise from
the patent-holder to delay or cancel the launch of its authorized generic.39

30. Generic Competition, supra note 29.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Robin Feldman. Ending Patent Exceptionalism and Structuring the Rule of Reason: The
Supreme Court Opens the Door for Both. 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 66 (2014).
34. IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, supra note 25, at 6.
35. Id.
36. Something Rotten, ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/ 14172627.
37. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).
38. Id.
39. The Economist, supra note 36.
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The four most common scenarios involving a brand-name company’s
consideration to a generic brand are: cash, poison pill clauses, noauthorized generic provisions, and forgiveness of damages.40 Cash is a
form of consideration in which a brand-name drug manufacturer pays cash
to a generic to delay entering the market.41 In this situation, the generic
receives a type of consideration that would not have been available as a
result of litigation — because under no circumstance would the brandname company supplement the generic’s entry into the market by paying it
money.42
A second type of compensation is a poison pill clause which ensures
that a generic drug company can expedite its entry when another generic
enters the market.43
These clauses ensure that no other generic
manufacturer, no matter how much time and resources it spends in its
litigation, can enter the market before the generic that has a poison pill
agreement with the brand-named company.
Another specific type of pay-for-delay agreement is a no-authorized
generic (“No-AG”) arrangement. When a generic enters the market to
compete with the brand, typically the brand-name drug producer can
introduce its own authorized generic version of the drug, making three
drugs available for consumers (one brand and two generics).44 The entry of
an authorized generic would make that 180-day window for the
unauthorized generic brand much less profitable. In a No-AG pay-fordelay arrangement, the generic manufacturer is being compensated for
agreeing to delay entry by the brand manufacturer’s own commitment to
delay entry with its authorized generic. 45 In effect, this allows the generic
manufacturer to keep their generic prices higher than they would be
otherwise.
The fourth scenario, brand forgiveness of damages, involves a
situation in which a generic has already entered the market. Even though
generics sell their products cheaper than brand-name drugs, a generic found
to be infringing on a brand-name drug’s patent could be liable for the
higher level of damages in the amount of the brand-name drug’s lost

40. See Michael A. Carrier. Payment After Actavis. 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 36-47.
41. Carrier, supra note 40, at 36.
42. Id. at 36–37.
43. Id. at 37.
44. Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Antitrust Master
Course VII (Oct. 10, 2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/591131/141010actavisspeech.pdf.
45. Id.
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profits.46 In addition to lost profits, generics could also be liable for any
reduction in brand prices resulting from the introduction of the generic
drug.47 With this type of settlement, the brand-name drug company could
settle by agreeing to forgive some of these damages.48
When a party with no claim for damages walks away with money or
other forms of compensation, simply so that it will stay away from the
patentee’s market, antitrust issues come into question for these unjustified
settlements.49
B. Patent Exceptionalism Conflicts with Antitrust Goals

The clash between patent law and antitrust law is a colossal one, with
antitrust law abhorring monopoly and patent law advocating it.50 Patent
exceptionalism is a misconstrued idea of the patent system to exercise free
reign to patent holders.51 Patent exceptionalism follows the line of
reasoning that when a patent is at play, antitrust should yield, and the
government should keep its nose out.52 This reasoning derives that given a
patent holder’s lawful right to exclude others from the market, a patent
conveys the right to cripple competition.53 Patent exceptionalism flows
from a distorted view of a patent’s actual function.54 As long as an
invention is useful, new, and obvious a patent can be obtained. A patent
does not grant the right to do anything at all; except to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention that is patented.55 The mere fact
that you have a patent is not an act of infringement. Multiple patents may
have overlapping rights to exclude,56 since a patent cannot infringe upon
another patent. Antitrust law, on the other hand, characterizes exclusion as
the prevention of an incursion of a rival in a competitive sphere.57

46. Carrier, supra note 40, at 44.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 45.
49. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(2004) (“[C]ollusion is “the supreme evil of antitrust.”).
50. Feldman, supra note 33, at 66–67.
51. See Id. at 62.
52. Id. at 66.
53. Id.; FTC. v. Watson Pharm.s, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1330 (11th Cir. 2012).
54. Id. at 68.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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C. Antitrust Scrutiny of Patent Settlements

Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 to combat
anticompetitive practices, to reduce market domination by individual
corporations, and to preserve unfettered competition as the rule of trade.58
Violations under the Sherman Act take one of two forms — a “per se
violation” or a violation of the “rule of reason.”59 A per se violation is
delineated in Section 1 of the Sherman Act as certain business practices,
and requires no further inquiry into the practice’s actual effect on the
market or the intentions of those individuals who engaged in the practice.60
A “rule of reason” analysis applies a totality of the circumstances test and
inquires as to whether the challenged practice promotes or suppresses
market competition.61 Intent and motive are often relevant in predicting
future consequences during a rule of reason analysis.62
The “rule of reason” doctrine is used to interpret the Sherman
Antitrust Act. In a traditional rule of reason analysis:
[The] court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its conditions before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the Reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.63

This inquiry seems three-pronged: (1) What harm to competition
results or may result from the collaborators’ activities? (2) What is the
object they are trying to achieve and is it a legitimate and significant one?
And (3) are there less restrictive alternatives to the challenged restraint?64
When applied to patents, the Sherman Act “imposes strict limitations
on the concerted activities in which a patent owner may lawfully engage

58. Legal Information Institute, Antitrust: An Overview, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW
SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust.
59. Id.
60. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2015).
61. Legal Information Institute, supra note 58.
62. Id.
63. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
64. Phillip Areeda, The “Rule of Reason” in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues, HARVARD
UNIVERSITY, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/antitrust.pdf
$file /antitrust.pdf.
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in.”65 In United States v. Singer Mfg. the Supreme Court held that the
agreements, although settling patent disputes, violated antitrust laws.66
That was because “the public interest in granting patent monopolies” exists
only to the extent that “the public is given a novel and useful invention” in
“consideration for its grant.”67

IV. The Hatch-Waxman Act
Numerous laws, regulations and legal precedents play an important
role in directly affecting drug competition by altering the structure and
shaping the competitive environment of these markets.68 One piece of
legislation in particular, The Hatch-Waxman Act, has been instrumental in
constructing the market for both generic and branded drugs.69 The Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known as
the Hatch-Waxman Act, amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act to create an abbreviated pathway for approval of new drugs that are
therapeutically equivalent to a brand drug. This process prescribes
pharmaceutical manufacturers to file an ANDA for approval of a generic
drug by the FDA.70 Congress’ objective when enacting the legislation was
to increase generic competition while balancing the resulting cost savings
with sufficient incentives to encourage continued medical innovation
through the development of new drugs.71
In addition to the patents that protect new inventions, the HatchWaxman Act grants periods of exclusivity to manufacturers that have new
drugs approved by FDA.72 Generic manufacturers frequently challenge
patents protecting these brand-name drugs. 73
Apparently most if not all reverse payment settlement agreements
arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug regulation, and
specifically in the context of suits brought under statutory provisions

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963).
Id. at 195–97.
Id. at 199 (White, J., concurring).
Olson & Wendling, supra note 14.
Id.
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2015).
Grabowski, supra note 19, at 1.
ASPE Issue Brief: Expanding the Use of Generic Drugs, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND DATA POLICE – U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 3 (2010).
73. Grabowski, supra note 19, at 1.
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allowing a generic drug manufacturer to challenge the validity of a
patent owned by an already approved brand-name drug owner.74

There are four key features of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The first of
these features is that a drug manufacturer must submit a New Drug
Application to the FDA if they wish to market a new prescription drug.75
The manufacturer must submit as part of the application: full reports of
investigations on the safety of the drug, a list of the articles used as
components of the drug, a full statement of the composition of the drug,
and more.76 Then, these new prescription drugs undergo a long,
comprehensive, and costly testing process in order to receive marketing
approval from the FDA.77 If a company only develops one drug, the
median spending is still around $351 million.78 The median cost per new
drug is $4.2 billion for companies that have launched more than three
drugs; this value increases to $5.3 billion for those that have launched more
than four drugs.79
The second feature of the Hatch-Waxman Act as the previously
mentioned is the abbreviated procedure for generic drugs, which grants
permission of a generic drug manufacturer to obtain similar marketing
approval.80 The generic drug manufacturer can file an Abbreviated New
Drug Application specifying that the generic has the same active
ingredients and is a bioequivalent to the already-approved brand-name
drug.81 This allows the generic manufacturer to avoid the costs and time
involved with the research of developing these drugs, which are required to
obtain approval. This in turn speeds the introduction of low-cost generic
drugs to market thereby furthering drug competition.
The third feature of the Hatch-Waxman Act addresses special
procedures for identifying and resolving related patent disputes. It requires
the brand-name manufacturer to list in its New Drug Application the
number and the expiration date of any relevant patent.82 The generic
74. FTC. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible
Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 24 (2004).
75. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1) (2015).
76. Id. at § 355(b)(1)(A)–(G).
77. Id. at § 355(b)(1).
78. Matthew Herper, How Much Does Pharmaceutical Innovation Cost? A Look at 100
Companies, FORBES, Aug. 11, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/thecost-of-inventing-a-new-drug-98-companies-ranked/.
79. Id.
80. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1)–(2).
81. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(iv) (2013).
82. See Id. at § 355(b)(1)(G).
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manufacturer must then assure the FDA that the generic will not infringe
the brand-name’s patents by: certifying that the brand-name manufacturer
has not listed any relevant patents, certify that any relevant patents have
expired, request approval to market beginning when any still-in-force
patents expire, or certify that any listed relevant patent is invalid or will not
be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug described in the
Abbreviated New Drug Application.83 This last option is also known as the
“Paragraph IV” route and automatically counts as patent infringement.
The fourth feature is a special incentive for a generic to be the first to
file an Abbreviated New Drug Application taking the Paragraph IV route.
That applicant gets a period of 180-day exclusivity, where no other generic
can compete with the brand-name drug.84 Of the provisions in the HatchWaxman Act aimed at facilitating generic drugs entrance into the market, I
will further discuss the ANDA process and Paragraph IV litigation.
A. Abbreviated New Drug Application

The ANDA process greatly reduces the cost of completing an FDA
application for approval of a generic drug.85 To meet the FDA standards
prior to the Hatch-Waxman amendments, generic manufacturers had to
duplicate many of the brand-name manufacturer trials, and submit their
own safety and efficacy data on their products.86 However, under the
ANDA process, generic manufacturers only need to demonstrate that their
products have the same active ingredients and are “bioequivalents” to their
brand-name counterparts.87 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generics are
also given an exemption to patent law rules, to begin research on the brandname’s drug prior to that brand-name drug company’s patent expiration.88
B. Paragraph IV Litigation

Another exemption to patent law that Hatch-Waxman allows generics
is Paragraph IV litigation. The Hatch-Waxman Act created incentives for
generic manufacturers to challenge brand-name patents before they
expire.89 During this process, the generic manufacturer notifies the FDA
that either its generic product does not infringe on a listed patent on the

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Id. at § 355 (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
See Id. at § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv).
Grabowski, supra note 19, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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brand-name drug, or that the brand-name drug’s patent is not valid.90 A
Paragraph IV challenge can be made at the dosage form or strength level.91
The challenged brand-name drug company then has 45 days of receiving
notice of a Paragraph IV litigation to file a patent infringement action
against the generic company.92 The FDA cannot approve the generic
company’s ANDA until the company prevails either in court, settlement, or
expiration of a 30-month stay.93
The incentive for a generic manufacturer to file a Paragraph IV
challenge and to receive FDA final approval of its application is a 180-day
period of exclusivity.94 The victor is then the only ANDA-approved
generic version allowed on the market.95 The first-to-file status is
determined by the day of filing.96 Multiple generic manufacturers can
share first-to-file status if they file on the same day.97 As mentioned above
in the previous section, the first generic manufacturer to enter the market
generally drops their prices only slightly below the manufacturer’s price.
Therefore, this 180-day window is potentially very profitable to a first-tofile Paragraph IV challenger.
The likelihood of a Paragraph IV challenge being filed has increased
substantially in recent years, and has been occurring earlier in the drug lifecycle. Only 9% of drugs experiencing first generic entry in 1995 had
experienced a Paragraph IV challenge prior to their first generic launch.98
That number has increased to 81% by drugs experiencing first generic entry
in 2012.99 Paragraph IV challenges also have been occurring in a shorter
amount of time following the launch of a brand-name drug. In 1995, the
average time between the launch of the brand-name drug and the first
Paragraph IV challenge was 18.7 years.100 In 2012, that span of time
dropped to an average of 6.9 years.101
There are a variety of factors that affect the initiation of a Paragraph
IV challenge. Paragraph IV challenge activity is even more aggressive for

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id.; See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(iii) (2013).
Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
Grabowski, supra note 19, at 2; See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2013).
Grabowski, supra note 19, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6 (Figure 3).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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new drugs with sales greater than $250 million.102 Another factor that
comes into play is the drug’s sales prior to generic entry, the nature of the
patents protecting the drug, and the ease with which generic manufacturers
can imitate the drug to satisfy FDA regulations.103 For example, for higherrevenue drugs, generic manufacturers may be less selective when filing
challenges, as even a low likelihood of success in litigation can yield a
large expected return on the investment necessary to challenge a patent.104

V. The Supreme Court’s Opinion on Reverse Payments
The most recent Supreme Court decision regarding reverse payments
is Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis.105 In this case, Respondent
Solvay Pharmaceuticals obtained a patent for its brand-name drug
AndroGel.106 The FDA approved the application and Solvay obtained a
patent in 2003.107 The pharmaceutical companies Actavis, Inc. and
Paddock Laboratories filed Abbreviated New Drug Applications for a
generic drugs modeled after AndroGel for their own generic products.108
Both companies certified under Paragraph IV that Solvay’s patent was
invalid and that their generic drugs did not infringe it.109 Solvay initiated
Paragraph IV litigation against Actavis and Paddock claiming patent
infringement.110 The FDA approved of Actavis’ generic product, but
instead of bringing its drug to market, Actavis and the other generic
manufacturers entered into a “reverse payment” settlement agreement with
Solvay.111 The specific terms of this agreement included Actavis agreeing
not to bring its generic to market for a specified number of years
(specifically sixty five months) before Solvay’s patent expired, and
agreeing to promote AndroGel to doctors in exchange for millions of
dollars”.112 The other generic companies made roughly similar promises.113

102. Id. at 6.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Found by looking up “reverse payments” and filtering to Supreme Court cases in
LexisNexis (last visited May 8, 2015).
106. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2224.
107. Id. at 2229.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2224–25.
110. Id. at 2225.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2229.
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Solvay agreed to pay millions of dollars to each generic.114 The FTC
stepped in and filed suit, alleging that the parties “violated §5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act by unlawfully agreeing to abandon their
patent challenges, to refrain from launching their low-cost generic drugs,
and to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits for nine years.”115 The
companies described these reverse payments as compensation for other
services the generics promised to perform, but the FTC contended that
those services had little value.116 According to the FTC, the true point of
the payments was to compensate the generics for agreeing not to compete
against AndroGel until 2015.117 The basic question addressed here is
whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish
competition in violation of antitrust laws.118
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that as long as the anticompetitive
effects of a settlement fall within the scope of the patent’s exclusionary
potential, the settlement is immune from antitrust attack.119 The Supreme
Court rejected this “scope of the patent” test used by the Eleventh Circuit.
The Supreme Court ruled that reverse payment settlement agreements
between branded and generic pharmaceutical companies are subject to
antitrust scrutiny and should be analyzed under the traditional antitrust
“rule of reason” analysis.120 The Supreme Court recognized that these
reverse payment settlements tend to have significant adverse effects on
competition.121
These agreements may lead to higher prices for
pharmaceuticals by deterring generic entry, and contribute to increased
health care costs that consumers, employers, and governments are
struggling to contain.122
A. FTC v. Actavis’ Antitrust Claim

The Court in Actavis concluded that the FTC should have been given
the opportunity to prove its antitrust claim for five reasons.123 First, the
Court reasoned that the specific restraint at issue has the potential for

114. Id.
115. Id. at 2230; App. 29, Complaint ¶5 (encompassing practices that violate the Sherman
Act and the other antitrust laws).
116. Id. at 2229.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2227.
119. FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 667 F.3d 1298, 1312 (2012).
120. Wright, supra note 44, at 2.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id.
123. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
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genuine adverse effects on competition.124 The payment in effect amounts
to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a
right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to
continue and the patent were held invalid.125 Permitting the patent
challenger to enter the market before the patent expires would also bring
about competition for the consumer’s benefit.126
Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes
prove unjustified.127 When a reverse payment reflects traditional settlement
considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for services,
there is no same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to
avoid the risk of patent invalidation.128 Traditionally, a party with a claim
(or counterclaim) for damages receives a sum equal to or less than the
value of its claim.129 However, in the reverse payment settlement at issue,
a party with no claim for damages (something that is usually true of a
Paragraph IV litigation defendant) walks away with money simply to stay
away from the patentee’s market.130
Third, where a reverse payment threatens to encourage unjustified
anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that
harm about in practice.131 This imbalance of power is reflected in the
amount the pharmaceutical company is willing to pay off the generic brand.
However, a strong and valid patent itself would help to assure such power
in a way that would lessen the incentive of a company seeking to induce
others to stay out of the market.132
Fourth, an antitrust action is likely to prove more administratively
feasible. An unexplained large reverse payment suggests that the patentee
has serious doubts about their patent’s survival.133 The objective of the
payment would then be to maintain high levels of profits and share it with
the patentee and the challenger, rather than face a potentially competitive
market.134

124. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-461.
125. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2235.
128. Id. at 2236.
129. Id. at 2233.
130. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408
(stating collusion is “the supreme evil of antitrust”).
131. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Lastly, the fact that a large unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust
liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit.135 It
is entirely possible to have settlements that do not include such unjustified
reverse payments.
B. The Actavis Court’s Conclusion

The Court in Actavis concludes that a reverse payment, where “large
and unjustified”, can bring the risk of significant anticompetitive effects.136
A court should examine the size of the payment, and assess its likely
anticompetitive effects along with its potential justifications.137 The Court
held that reverse payment settlements should be analyzed under the
traditional “rule of reason” framework, and that the plaintiff’s prima facie
demonstration of a settlement’s anticompetitive effects necessarily
“depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future
litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might
represent payment, and the lack of other convincing justification.”138 This
conclusion lends itself to the next issue namely: what constitutes a reverse
payment that is worth litigation over a patent’s validity?
The Court explained that when future courts analyze a payment that
presents anticompetitive concerns, those courts should look to the
payment’s “size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future
litigation costs, its independence from other services for which it might
represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing justification.”139
The Court has a strong preference for determining patent strength by
examining the payment rather than the patent itself.140 An unexplained
large reverse payment could suggest that the patent holder has serious
doubts about the patent’s survival.141 Therefore, forms of payment from
the brand-name drug to the generic drug company could constitute
anticompetitive harm, in which even strong patents would not be protected
from scrutiny.
The Actavis Court however recognized two categories for which the
settling parties could offer justifications.142 The settling parties should be
allowed to show that the payment is either (1) no larger than litigation
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 2237.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2237–38.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
Carrier, supra note 40, at 18.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
Carrier, supra note 40, at 19.
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costs, or (2) that the payment is for unrelated generic services rather than
delayed entry.143 Regarding litigation costs, if a defendant can justify
payments that amount to no more than rough approximation of the
litigation expenses saved through a settlement with redeeming virtues, then
there is not the same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits
to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.144
The second justification involves brand payments for unrelated
generic services. These can include the brand-named drug paying for a
generic company to market its product, to provide inventory or backup
manufacturing services, to supply them with raw material or finished drug
products, and/or for development agreements for unrelated products.145 If
the brand really is paying for generic services in a transaction that does not
involve the dividing of monopoly profits to pay for the delayed entry, it
could offer a legitimate justification for its payment to the generic.146
Aside from those two situations, Actavis leaves open for question of
the type of compensation that constitutes an exclusion payment violating
antitrust laws. The Actavis Court directs lower courts to focus on the
presence of significant unjustified anticompetitve consequences, and
emphasized four elements to consider.147 These include: payments’ size,
scale in relation to the payer’s anticipated future litigation costs,
independence from other services for which it might represent payment,
and lack of any other convincing justification.148 How the lower courts
have interpreted Actavis will come up later in discussion.
C. The Commissioner’s Response to the Actavis Holding

Joshua Wright was sworn in as a Commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission on January 11, 2013, to a term that expires in September
2019.149 Wright said there was no question the ruling covers all kinds of
considerations.150 He states that, “Actavis clearly applies to reverse
payment settlements involving noncash compensation.”151 To not involve

143. Id.
144. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236.
145. Carrier, supra note 40, at 22.
146. Carrier, supra note 40, at 21–22.
147. Carrier, supra note 40, at 30.
148. Id.
149. Joshua D. Wright: Commissioner, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/
about-ftc/biographies/joshua-d-wright.
150. Melissa Lipman, No Question Actavis Goes Beyond Cash, FTC’s Wright Says, LAW
360 (Oct. 10, 2014, 9:54 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/586388.
151. Id.
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such payments would create artificial limitations that simply do not make
economic sense and would impose a rule that elevates form over
substance.”152
One standard the Supreme Court set for deals that might pose antitrust
problems is comparing a payment to the costs the drug maker saves by
avoiding further litigation as an appropriate benchmark.153 Wright however
suggests that those litigation savings are not a good benchmark because
even “very large payments,” much bigger than avoided litigation costs, can
produce settlements that ultimately benefit consumers.154
A litigation cost benchmark does not reliably identify anticompetitive settlements and generates considerable risk of chilling
consumer welfare-increasing settlements. As lower courts continue
to struggle with how to identify reverse payment settlements that
likely reduce consumer welfare, it is important to accurately
identify the relationship between payment size and harm before
concluding payment size is indeed a ‘workable surrogate for a
patent’s weakness,’ as the court suggested it may be.155

Beyond advocating a “rule of reason” analysis, the Court did not set
forth a clear structure for reviewing settlement agreements and left this job
to the district courts.156
The Commissioner notes that the post-Actavis landscape remains
unsettled with respect to a number of critical questions concerning how
lower courts will and should evaluate reverse payment settlements.157
Particularly, he notes three questions: (1) does Actavis apply to noncash
payments, (2) are reverse payments that are larger than avoided litigation
costs considered to be “large and unjustified” within the Court’s
framework, and (3) should courts balance competitive harms associated
with delayed generic entry of a particular drug against any consumer
welfare benefits to consumers of other drugs that would not occur but for
the settlement.158

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Supra note 44, at 14.
156. Jason Oliver, Supreme Court Holds Reverse Payment Settlement Agreements to be
Analyzed Under “Rule of Reason” Approach, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP (June 21, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1bf5b27a-6c24-4e24-9750-48d7ae135587.
157. Supra note 44, at 2
158. Id.
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Regarding the first question of whether or not reverse payments must
take the form of cash to be subject to antitrust scrutiny, Wright believes
that Actavis clearly applies to reverse payment settlements involving
noncash compensation.159 Even before Actavis, brand-name and generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers had entered into increasingly complex and
creative settlement agreements that frequently included noncash
consideration.160 Today’s settlement agreements include any number of
nonmonetary elements in which a brand-name company agrees to not
introduce an authorized generic that might compete with the generic firm’s
product, such as complex supply agreements, marketing, and other
advertising arrangements.161
Regarding the second question, Wright contemplated the economic
conditions under which inferences about competitive harm can reliably be
drawn from a large payment and how exactly one interested in enforcing
the antitrust laws or counseling clients would proceed to identify such
payments.162 He finds that litigation costs are not an appropriate
benchmark for evaluating reverse payments under the “rule of reason”.163
He suggests that lower courts should be reluctant to rely on a truncated
litigation cost benchmark substitute for a more full-blown “rule of reason”
inquiry.164
The next question is how to analyze large noncash payments under the
rule of reason. This is an inquiry that is difficult to define. In the most
common form of noncash payment from a brand manufacturer to a generic
manufacturer to delay entry, a no-authorized generic agreement, the
consumer welfare impact of such an arrangement is simple to analyze
because the No-AG commitment offers no consumer benefits. But this is
not always the case, as pharmaceutical companies are settling their patent
disputes in evermore complex fashions, often attempting to disguise the
reverse payment.165 The rule of reason would require lower courts to
analyze all the costs and benefits associated with the challenged conduct.

159. Id. at 5.
160. Id.
161. Lipman, supra note 150.
162. Id. at 9.
163. Id. at 12.
164. Id. at 15.
165. FTC Files Amicus Brief explaining That “No-AG” Agreements Are Used by Drug
Companies to Delay Generic Competition, FTC (Aug. 13, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-files-amicus-brief-explaining-no-ag-agreements-are-used-drug.
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VI. Post-Actavis Landscape
A. Circuit Courts

The Third Circuit is the first Court of Appeals to take on a pay-fordelay case since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on this matter.166 Experts
say that the case will be significant as the first appellate ruling applying
Actavis since the justices ruled in 2013.167 The Third Circuit will weigh in
on the question of whether generic drug makers must receive cash for a
deal to count as a reverse payment.
The Appellate Court heard arguments over whether a New Jersey
district court correctly concluded that the justices were only talking about
cash settlements when they opened the door to antitrust challenges to
Hatch-Waxman Act settlements.168 In King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc.,169
the plaintiffs argued that the Third Circuit incorrectly dismissed their suit.
They accused GlaxoSmithKline PLC of paying off Teva Pharmaceutical
Industries Ltd. to delay launching a generic version of the drug Lamictal
until the day before GSK’s patents were set to expire. In exchange,
plaintiffs argued that GSK promised not to launch its own authorized
generic during Teva’s 180-day exclusivity window.170 The defendants say
that a no-authorized-generic promise was simply a term of an exclusive
early-entry license, which has always been allowed under patent law.171
The defendants also make a case that a no-authorized generic provision is
basically an exclusive license, and exclusive licenses are something that are
expressly allowed under patent law.172 This issue comes down to what
kind of payment the Supreme Court was referring to in Actavis.
B. District Courts

Of the seven courts to have considered this reverse settlement issue in
light of Actavis, only two have ruled that Actavis requires cash payments.173
The bulk of other district courts that looked at the issue of these types of

166. Melissa Lipman, 3rd Circ. To Decide If Reverse Payments Must Be Cash, LAW 360
(Nov. 17, 2014, 4:19 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/591582/3rd-circ-to-decide-if-reversepayments-must-be-cash.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388 (3d Cir.
2015).
170. Lipman, supra note 166.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Lipman, supra note 150.
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payments seem to agree that Actavis goes beyond straightforward cash
payments.174 A broader issue that has come up is whether or not, for
pleading purposes, the plaintiffs would have to specify a number for the
payment value.175 Actavis merely says the payment must be “large and
unjustified.”176 How should noncash payments have to be estimated in
monetary terms in order to figure out if the payment counts as “large and
unjustified”?177 Drug manufacturers will be arguing over whether
settlements have to include cash payments to receive antitrust scrutiny
under Actavis.178
In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation held that the Actavis decision
required cash consideration in order to trigger the “rule of reason” scrutiny
fin determining whether a reverse settlement payment violates federal
antitrust law.179 The court held that plaintiffs had not adequately alleged
payment in the form of cash in exchange for agreement to stay out of the
market for that drug, and the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim upon
which relief could be granted.180 The motion to dismiss was therefore
granted.181 The court stated the five factors in determining whether reverse
settlement payments satisfy the rule of reason and how it could be
measured when the reverse payment is made in cash. However, noncash
settlements were almost impossible to measure against these factors.182
In a second case, the New Jersey District Court held that the buyers’
class action complaint challenging the patent settlement failed to state an
antitrust claim, since there was no transfer of money in the settlement.183
A majority of courts seem to take the opposite position that a reverse
payment is not limited to cash payments. The District Court of New
Jersey, acknowledged that Actavis addressed cash payments, but concluded

174. Lipman, supra note 166.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Lipman, supra note 150.
178. Id.
179. See In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 195 (D.R.I. 2014).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 191.
183. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. CIV. 12-995 WHW, 2012 WL
6725580, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012) adhered to on reconsideration, 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 566
(D.N.J. 2014).
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that the Supreme Court focused on the antitrust intent of the settling parties
rather than the manner of payment.184
The United States District Court in the Northern District of California
stated that to constitute a “payment” under the “rule of reason” test, used in
conjunction with evaluating terms of reverse payment in settlements
involving patent infringement suits, the court must be able to calculate a
value.185 The court found no need to restrict the definition of payment only
to cash, since there are many plausible methods by which a court may
calculate the value of nonmonetary terms.186
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also held that a reverse
“payment” was not limited to cash.187 That court also concluded that a
non-authorized generic provision did not have the same economic effect as
a grant of exclusive license to enter market prior to expiration of a
patent.188
The District Court in Massachusetts also did not see it fit to read into
the opinion a strict limitation of its principles to monetary-based
arrangements alone.189 Adoption of a broader interpretation of the word
“payment” would serve the purpose of aligning the law with modern-day
realities. Nowhere in Actavis did the Supreme Court explicitly require
some sort of monetary transaction to take place for an agreement between a
brand and a generic manufacturer to constitute a reverse payment.190
The District Court of Connecticut also follows the same line of
reasoning and does not think these payments should be limited to cash
payments.191 Since large and unjustified reverse payments can bring with
them the risk of significant anticompetitive effects regardless of the
particular form of transfer, they should not be limited to cash payments.192

184. In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 WL 4988410, at *20 (D.N.J. Oct.
6, 2014).
185. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F.
Supp. 3d 1052, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
186. Id. at 1069–70.
187. In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa 2014).
188. Id. at 750.
189. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass.
2013).
190. Id. at 392.
191. In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 3:14–md–2516, 2015 WL 1311352 at *11-12 (D.
Conn. 2015).
192. Id. at 12.
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VII. Conclusion
Pharmaceutical companies spend much of their time and resources in
conducting research and clinical trials to develop new drugs. Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drugs can refer to the same tests that the
brand-name drugs have conducted, as long as the generic brands can
prove similarities in the biological makeup of both drugs. As a result,
pharmaceutical companies have been paying off generic companies to not
enter the market until their patents are nearly expired — a transaction
known as a reverse payment. These companies have been settling
lawsuits in order to maximize their own profit, at the expense of the
benefit to society. This trend of reverse payment patent settlements that
has developed in response to the Hatch-Waxman Act has promoted anticompetition in the marketplace, and even rises to the level of antitrust
scrutiny. While proving to be beneficial to the pharmaceutical industry,
reverse payments create an antitrust issue by allowing the pharmaceutical
companies to monopolize the market space, as well as creating a public
interest problem by taking away public access to cheaper drugs.
Congress’ objective when enacting the Hatch-Waxman legislation
was to increase generic competition while balancing the resulting cost
savings with sufficient incentives to encourage continued medical
innovation through the development of new drugs. Like most of the
district courts that have taken on this post-Actavis issue, I agree that
reverse payments should not be confined to cash payments in order to rise
to the level of antitrust scrutiny. Given the complexity of modern day
payment formulations, it would be detrimental for future reverse payment
cases to pigeon-hole the parameters of payments to cash. In determining
the antitrust scrutiny level, it is important to consider whether the brandname drug has conveyed to the generic a type of consideration that is not
a direct consequence of winning the lawsuit.
Generic drugs play an important role in the pharmaceutical consumer
landscape. Many policymakers view generic drug competition as the
principal method to contain the rapid growth in drug costs. Therefore,
restricting options for American consumers would go against the original
intent of the Hatch-Waxman Act.

